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Using post-1995 Japanese data we propose a theory-based sign-restriction SVAR approach to 
identify monetary policy shocks when the economy is at the zero-lower bound. The 
identifying restrictions accord with predictions of corresponding DSGE models. Our results 
show that while a quantitative easing shock leads to a significant but temporary rise in output, 
the effect on inflation is not significantly different from zero. This suggests that while the 
Japanese Quantitative Easing experiment was successful in stimulating real activity in the 
shortrun, it did not lead to any increase in inflation. These results are interesting not only for 
Japan, but also for other advanced economies where monetary policy is currently constrained 
by the ZLB. 






Munich Graduate School of Economics 
University of Munich 
Munich / Germany 
heike.schenkelberg@lrz.uni-muenchen.de 
Sebastian Watzka 
Seminar for Macroeconomics 
University of Munich 








We would like to thank Zeno Enders, Matthias Hertweck, Nikolay Hristov, Gerhard Illing, 
Florian Kajuth, Helmut Lütkepohl, Gernot Müller, Gianni De Nicolo, Gert Peersman, 
Ekkehart Schlicht and TimoWollmershäuser as well as seminar participants at the 
Universities of Bonn and Munich and at the CESifo Conference on Macroeconomics for 
helpful comments. All errors are our own. 1 Introduction
We study the real eects of Quantitative Easing (QE) in a structural VAR (SVAR) when the
shortterm interest rate is constrained by the Zero-Lower-Bound (ZLB). Using monthly Japanese
data since 1995 - a period during which the Bank of Japan's target rate, the overnight call rate,
has been very close to zero - and sign restrictions based on corresponding DSGE models, we nd
that an increase in reserves leads to a signicant 0.5 percent rise in industrial production after
about two years. This rise lasts for about two years. On the other hand, our results indicate
that the same shock has no eect on ination. Thus our results provide mixed evidence on the
successfulness of QE in Japan. Whilst real economic activity does seem to pick up after a QE-
shock, this does not seem to aect ination in such a way that Japan could exit its deationary
period through such a policy shock. However, this conclusion strictly holds only under the usual
caveat in SVAR- analysis that the monetary policy shock we consider must be a small one -
one that is not allowed to change the policy regime or any other of the structural relations we
estimate. Whilst we argue this is precisely the kind of shock that central banks currently inict
on our economies, we should be careful not to conclude that any more aggressive policy changes
by central banks to escape the deationary period of the liquidity trap1 are doomed to fail.
Our study adds to the existing literature in various important ways. First, focusing specically on
post-1995 Japanese data where the policy rate of the Bank of Japan, the call rate, was virtually
zero,2 allows us to identify a monetary policy shock under liquidity trap conditions. We call such
a shock unconventional monetary policy shock or QE-shock for short. Second, including standard
macro variables in our VAR allows us to study the eects of such a QE-shock on a broader set
of variables than usually studied in the literature on unconventional monetary policy eects. In
particular, our approach allows us to study the eects of a QE-shock on real economic activity
and on the ination rate - the two variables of ultimate interest to the central bank. Third,
using a sign-restriction approach to identify our QE-shock allows us to remain agnostic about
whether, how, and when real activity and ination respond to the QE-shock. Fourth, because
our restrictions are rmly grounded in liquidity trap theory we believe they are credible in the
sense of Sims (1980) and that what we measure in our SVAR is indeed the structural QE-shock
we are aiming at. Finally, because shortterm policy rates in the US, the Euro Area, the UK
and other economies around the world are currently very close to zero and therefore possibly
also constrained by the ZLB, our results shed light on the eects of the currently implemented
nonstandard policy measures adopted by the leading central banks in the world.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: The next section discusses the key ndings in the
literature on monetary policy eects at the ZLB. Section 3 then briey discusses key features
of the main monetary policy decisions implemented by the Bank of Japan since the stock and
1For instance along the lines of Krugman (1998) or Svensson (2003).
2See Figure 1.
2housing market crashes in the early 90s. Our SVAR and its key identication strategies using
sign-restrictions based on liquidity trap theory are explained in Section 4. Results are then
presented in Sections 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Eects of monetary policy shocks at the ZLB in the em-
pirical literature
The eects of monetary policy shocks when monetary policy is not constrained by the ZLB
has been well documented in the literature. By and large there is a broad consensus that
expansionary monetary policy, by lowering the policy interest rate, aects ination and output
positively, but only very sluggishly and only temporarily.3 This of course is roughly in line with
our macroeconomic theories on how monetary shocks aect the real economy under normal times
when the interest rate is not constrained by the ZLB. It is somewhat surprising therefore that
there is much less empirical evidence on the real eects of monetary policy shocks when monetary
policy is in fact constrained by the ZLB. One obvious reason might be that most economies until
very recently have not been in such a situation and that sample periods to use in estimation
would thus be notoriously short. However, it is also true that at least since 2000, when the Fed
was fast to lower the Federal Funds rate to very low levels in response to the bursting of the
IT-bubble, there has been an important theoretical discussion amongst central bankers as how
to avoid liquidity traps and how to escape them once an economy found itself in the trap.4
The recent nancial crisis has led to renewed interest in the empirical eects of the so-called
unconventional monetary policies implemented by the leading central banks. However, most of
these studies focus on the eect unconventional policies have on various interest rates or interest
rate spreads. They do not study the eects of those policies on other standard macro variables like
output or ination. But these variables of course are the key variables of interest to the central
bank and the public and of course important for welfare considerations. The growing body of
literature that studies the eects of unconventional monetary policy on such nancial market
variables include Bernanke et al. (2004), Gagnon et al. (2010), Hamilton and Wu (2010) and
Stroebel and Taylor (2009) for the US, Meier (2009) for the UK, ECB (2010) for the Euro Area,
and Oda and Ueda (2007) and Ueda (2010) for Japan. Broadly speaking, these studies do nd
negative eects on yield spreads of unconventional policies, or more precisely of announcements
of such policies, in the sense that the yields of various assets do tend to decline thereby narrowing
the spread to the corresponding riskless rate. However, these eects are generally found to be
rather small. For instance, Hamilton and Wu (2010) nd that a purchase of 400 billion US
dollars in 10-year US Treasury Bonds would lead to a 14 basis points fall in the 10-year yield.
3Compare Christiano et al. (1998). But note dierent identifying restrictions do in fact lead to slightly dierent
results, compare Uhlig (2005) and Lanne and L utkepohl (2008).
4See e.g. Bernanke (2002), Bernanke and Reinhart (2004), Krugman (1998) or Svensson (2003).
3Gagnon et al. (2010) nd that the same policy measure would lower longterm yields by 20 basis
points. Meier (2009) estimates that the Bank of England's QE-related asset purchases lowered
gilt yields by around 40-100 basis points.
It is important to note that the theoretical impact of such a policy announcement on longterm
yields is far from clear. Most theoretical studies, such as e.g. Doh (2010), refer to some kind
of imperfect substitutability between assets and explain the expansionary eect of such a policy
decision by arguing that the purchase of longterm bonds by the central bank will naturally
lower longterm bond yields, because the central bank buys those bonds at a higher price than
the market. This lower longterm yield on government bonds then feeds through - via portfolio
shifts (Meltzer, 1995) - to other asset markets, like the corporate bond market and the stock
market making longterm nancing for investment and durable goods cheaper thereby stimulating
aggregate demand. Being constrained by the ZLB the traditional interest channel which normally
lowers longterm yields through the expectations hypothesis does not function anymore and the
central bank circumvents this by directly intervening in the market for longterm bonds. This
argument is partly supported by the empirical evidence of the above mentioned studies. However,
theoretically it is not clear that longterm yields are indeed supposed to fall after such a policy
announcement. Indeed, if market participants believe the central bank intervention is successful
in stimulating the economy by increasing aggregate demand, ination and real rates are likely to
rise in the future. Thus inationary expectations as of today should rise and longterm nominal
yields should in fact rise. In other words, the eectiveness of such a policy move might instead
be seen by rising longterm yields, not by falling yields.
We therefore argue that it is important to focus on the eects on the real economy when analyzing
unconventional monetary policy. So far, the correpsonding empirical evidence is rather scarce
and a consensus on the eectiveness of these measures in terms of the real economy has not
yet been reached. Studies using sign restrictions to identify unconventional monetary shocks
include Kamada and Sugo (2006), Baumeister and Benati (2010) and Peersman (2010). While
Baumeister and Benati (2010) nd some signicant real eects of quantitative easing in dierent
countries including Japan, results reported by Kamada and Sugo (2006) are less optimistic. Both
studies rely, however, on relatively restrictive identication schemes. Peersman (2010) nds that
unconventional shocks can in principle aect macroeconomic variables in the Euro area; the
responses of output and prices are, however, much more delayed compared to standard policy
measures. Using a large-scale Bayesian VAR model Lenza et al. (2010) report some signicant
eects of unconventional monetary shocks on macroeconomic variables in the Euro area but focus
on policy measures that actually aected the interest rate spread. Finally, Chung et al. (2011),
using a set of structural and time series statistical models, nd that asset purchases by the Fed
have been successful at mitigating the macroeconomic costs of the ZLB in the US.
43 Monetary Policy in Japan since the late 1980s
This section briey summarises key monetary policy developments in Japan since the late
1980s/early 1990s - in other words since the bursting of the Japanese stock and real estate
bubbles. We only sketch key developments, for a thorough discussion please consult Mikitani
and Posen (2000), Ugai (2007) and Ueda (2010). We divide this period into pre- and post-1995
based on the behaviour of the Bank of Japan's target interest rate, the call rate, which has been
lowered by the Bank of Japan to virtually zero during 1995. Figure 1 shows key macroeconomic
variables for Japan since 1981.
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The gure reveals the widely documented behaviour of the dramatic fall in real GDP growth
rates after the bursting of the asset prices bubbles in 1990/91. Whilst GDP grew in the pre-1991
period by an average rate of 3.9 percent per year, it slowed down to only 0.8 percent post-1991.
This of course is the numerical basis for the well-known label "Japan's lost decade." Meanwhile
the notoriously low Japanese unemployment rate has more than doubled while the core ination
rate has steadily trended below zero since 2000. The following subsections give some more details
to Japanese monetary policy pre- and post-1995.
53.1 The bursting of the bubbles and delayed monetary policy reaction
The bursting of the stock market bubble can be seen in Figure 2. The stock market was rising
dramatically until around 1990. The gure shows that this went together with rapid increase in
industrial production under fairly low and constant rates of ination (compare also Figure 1).
Figure 2: Industrial production, Consumer Price Index and NIKKEI stock index since 1980. The
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Realising that the elevated stock and land prices seemed out of touch with fundamentals the
Bank of Japan did in fact continuously increase the call rate (compare again Figure 1). Optimism
turned into pessimism around 1990/91 and both stock and land prices started falling rapidly. It
is nowadays widely agreed that the initial response of the Bank of Japan to the bursting of the
asset price bubbles was too slow and not aggressive enough (Jinushi et al., 2000). In fact, Figure
1 shows that the call rate was high until 1992/3 and then only lowered very gradually until it
reached 0.5 percent in the last quarter of 1995.
3.2 Post-1995
But even with its key policy rate at 0.5 percent and therewith close to zero, the Bank of Japan
was very slow in implementing unconventional expansionary policy measures. In fact, only in
1999 did the Bank of Japan ocially introduce its so-called zero interest rate policy (ZIRP) when
it lowered the call rate to 0.03 percent (see Figure 3). It also tried to steer market expectations
by adding commitments to its policy statements indicating that it would keep the call rate low
for longer time.
6Figure 3: Key Bank of Japan interest rates since 1980. The call rate has been the Bank of























Basic Loan and Discount Rate Call Rate (uncollateralized overnight)
10-year Government Bond Yield
When the Japanese economy started to recover slightly in 2000 with real GDP growth of 2.8
percent, the call rate was raised to 0.25 percent and ZIRP was ocially ended. However, the
worldwide economic recession following the bursting of stock market bubbles in response to the
IT-bubble led to renewed macroeconomic problems in Japan. This time the Bank of Japan intro-
duced a more aggressive policy programme. From March 2001 until March 2006 it implemented
the so-called "Quantitative Easing Policy" (QEP) which consisted basically of three elements: (i)
the operating target was changed from the call rate to the outstanding current account balances
held by banks at the Bank of Japan, (ii) to commit itself to continue providing ample liquidity
to banks until ination stabilised at zero percent or a slight increase, and (iii) to increase the
amount of outright purchases of longterm Japanese government bonds.5
The monetary development and the eect of the Bank of Japan's QEP measures can be seen in
Figure 4. We plot that part of the monetary base that is the current account holdings of banks
at the Bank of Japan, in other words these are bank reserves held at the central bank. The gure
clearly shows the enormous increase in reserves during the QEP period and later again when the
recent nancial crisis hit. At the same time we see that the growth rate of M2 and Certicates
of Deposits (CDs) steadily slowed since 1980.
Having these macroeconomic and monetary developments in mind we next want to present our
identication strategy based on the reasonable assumption that the Bank of Japan since 1995
did not conduct its monetary policy through the call rate anymore - which was constrained by
the ZLB - but by changing the reserve holdings of banks at the Bank of Japan.
5See the authorative survey by Ugai (2007) for more details.













































































































































































M2 + CDs (left scale) M0 - Current Account Balances (right scale)
 
4 Identication of structural shocks in a sign-restriction
VAR
4.1 Basic VAR model
4.1.1 Benchmark specication
To analyse the eects of monetary policy on economic activity and the price level at the ZLB,
the following reduced-form VAR model is estimated:
Yt = c + A(L)Yt 1 + ut; (1)
where c is a vector of intercepts,6 Yt is a vector of endogenous variables, A(L) is a matrix of
autoregressive coecients of the lagged values of Yt and ut is a vector of residuals. In this model,
the reduced-form error terms are related to the uncorrelated structural errors t according to:
ut = B 1t: (2)
6Following Uhlig (2005) and Peersman (2010) we do not include a time trend in our benchmark VAR model.
In fact, including a trend would require an adjustment of the prior used in the Bayesian estimation (Uhlig, 1994).
However, our main results are insensitive to linearly detrending the variables prior to estimation. Results are
available upon request.
8In our benchmark regression we include the following four macroeconomic variables in the VAR-
system:
Yt = [Pt; IPt; RESt; LTYt]; (3)
where Pt denotes the core consumer price index and IPt indicates the Japanese industrial produc-
tion index. Moreover, we include reserves (RESt)7 and the 10-year yield of Japanese government
bonds (LTYt) in the set of regressors. The VAR model is estimated by means of Bayesian meth-
ods using monthly data over the period January 1995 to September 2010. In the benchmark
case, six lags of the endogenous variables are included in the estimation, which seems to be
sucient to capture the dynamics of the model8. Except for the longterm yield, all variables are
seasonally adjusted and incl uded as log-levels.9 We do not include a measure of Japanese money
supply such as M2 + CDs since a number of empirical studies conclude that the relationship
between money supply and economic activity or prices disappeared in the course of the 1990s
(see e.g. Miyao (2005)). This is in line with the descriptive evidence given in Figure 4 showing
that during the period of massive quantitative easing in the early 2000's M2 + CDs did in fact
not increase with the monetary base. Thus, the money stock is not likely to be an important
variable with respect to the transmission of monetary policy during the 1990's and 2000's. A
detailed description of the data is given in Appendix A.
4.1.2 Additional specications
Within the theoretical literature on monetary policy at the ZLB the role of the exchange rate in
the transmission of unconventional policy has been stressed by a number of studies (Orphanides
and Wieland, 2000; Coenen and Wieland, 2003; McCallum, 2000). These models usually imply
a real depreciation of the domestic currency following a base money injection due to portfolio
rebalancing eects. In order to shed more light on the role of the exchange rate at the ZLB we
estimate an additional specication including the real eective exchange rate of the Yen against
other currencies (EXt):
Yt = [Pt; IPt; RESt; LTYt; EXt]: (4)
We argue above that Japan has been at the zero lower bound during the whole sample period
under consideration. In the course of 1995, the call rate has been reduced to 0.5% severely
mitigating its importance as a policy instrument. However, ocially, the reserve target has
7As a measure of reserves we consider outstanding current account balances held at the Bank of Japan, which
is a base money component.
8While dierent lag length criteria lead to dierent suggestions concerning the number of lags to include, all of
them tend to propose an even shorter lag length. Our main results are, however, robust to varying the lag length.
9According to Sims et al. (1990) this leads to consistent parameter estimates even in the presence of unit roots.
9replaced the interest rate as the main policy instrument in 2001 only with the introduction
of QEP. Therefore, we additionally estimate a further specication that augments the model
given by equation (4) by adding the call rate, denoted by Rt. If indeed this variable has been
unimportant as a policy instrument even prior to 2001 we should not observe any signicant
reaction of the nominal interest rate to the monetary shock and the remaining results should
remain unchanged. Thus, we additionally estimate the following specication:
Yt = [Pt; IPt; RESt; LTYt; EXt; Rt]: (5)
4.2 Identication of structural shocks
As in Uhlig (2005), Canova and Nicolo (2002) and Peersman (2005) we impose sign restrictions
on the impulse response functions to identify an unconventional monetary shock. In order to pre-
vent that other disturbances enter the identied unconventional monetary shock we additionally
identify two traditional shocks; a positive demand and a positive supply shock. To be able to
distinguish between the responses to the respective shocks, we require these disturbances to be
orthogonal to the monetary shock.10 Using this specication we make sure that the expansion-
ary monetary shock is not confused with disturbances related to business cycle uctuations. In
contrast to identication strategies based on Cholesky or Blanchard-Quah decompositions, the
sign restriction approach explicitly incorporates assumptions that are often used implicitly al-
lowing a more transparent procedure. Moreover, imposing zero restrictions on contemporaneous
or long-run impulse responses is avoided. While zero-restrictions on contemporaneous interac-
tions may not hold in reality (Faust, 1998), long-run restrictions may be biased in small samples
(Faust and Leeper, 1997). The sign restriction approach is implemented by taking draws for the
VAR parameters from the Normal-Wishart posterior11, constructing an impulse vector for each
draw and calculating the corresponding impulse responses for all variables over the specied hori-
zon.12 In particular, the reduced-form residuals ut are related to the structural shocks according
to equation (2) above with B = W
1=2
 Q, where W
1=2
 is the Cholesky factor obtained from
the Bayesian estimation of the VAR model for each of the 1000 draws, and Q is an orthogonal
matrix with QQ0 = I. To generate Q, we draw a random matrix U from an N(0,1) density and
decompose this matrix using a QR decomposition. For each of the 1000 Cholesky factors we
10Mountford and Uhlig (2009) show how the identication setup in Uhlig (2005) can be extended to control for
additional shocks. Our estimation strategy closely follows their approach.
11Uhlig (1994) oers a detailed discussion on the Normal-Wishart prior. His observation 5 states that in the
case of nonexplosive roots, i.e. jj  1, using a at Normal-Wishart prior is equivalent to using a critics prior
in practical applications. While the Normal-Wishart prior puts equal weights on all values of , the critics prior
emphasizes larger values of  and is thus consistent with the prior belief that unit roots are unlikely.
12Estimation was performed on the basis of Fabio Canova's SVAR Matlab codes, which can be downloaded
from his website http://www.crei.cat/people/canova/.
10repeat drawing U until we nd a matrix generating responses to the respective shocks that are in
line with the sign restrictions we impose. Additionally, as in Peersman (2010) we employ exact
zero restrictions on the contemporaneous impact matrix B. Using a mixture of sign restrictions
and zero restrictions on selected impact responses allows us to improve identication of the struc-
tural shocks and thus to enhance the interpretation of the respective impulse response functions
by exploiting additional economic information (Kilian, 2009).13 The impulse response functions
rk
ijt of variable j = 1;:::;5 to shock i = 1;2;3 at horizon t = 1;:::;60 constructed using model
k = 1;:::1000 (where k indexes the dierent values of Q) are then summarised by computing the
median over k of rk
ijt.
It is important to note, however, that solely reporting the median of all admissible impulse
responses may be problematic, especially if several shocks are identied at the same time (Fry
and Pagan, 2007). First, since the median over k summarises information obtained from dierent
models, the reported structural impulse response functions may be hard to interpret. Second, and
related, since two shocks may be generated from two dierent models, the structural disturbances
are not necessarily orthogonal. We account for these issues by following Fry and Pagan (2007)
and additionally reporting impulse responses generated by one model Q; the model that leads to
impulse responses that are as close to the median over k of rk
ijt as possible. This model is found
by rst standardizing the impulse responses rk
ijt by subtracting o their median and divide by
their standard deviation over the 1000 models satisfying the sign restrictions. The standardized
impulse responses are then grouped into a vector k for each value Qk. We subsequently choose
the model that minimizes k
0
k and report the corresponding impulse responses; see Section 5.5.
4.3 Demand, supply and monetary shocks at the ZLB in the theoretical
literature
As has been stressed above, the existing empirical VAR literature on the transmission of uncon-
ventional monetary policy is rather scarce and thus a broad consensus about the identication of
a QE-shock at the ZLB is yet to be reached. Moreover, it is not clear ex ante whether the usual
identifying restrictions for aggregate demand and supply shocks are still valid if the interest rate
is close to zero. In particular, the main impediment to disentangling the monetary shock from
business cycle disturbances at the ZLB is the fact that the interest rate cannot move following
either shock. Nevertheless, we show below that it is still possible to derive a clear identication
13There have been alternative approaches to improve the interpretation of structural impulse response functions
generated by using a sign restriction approach by using additional information to identify the shocks. One
proposition has been to impose restrictions on cross correlations of impulse responses, thereby narrowing down
the set of admissible responses (Canova and Nicolo, 2002; Canova and Paustian, 2010). Furthermore, Uhlig (2005)
employs a penalty function in order to use more identifying information. Finally, identifying an oil market VAR,
Kilian (2009) show how to exploit additional information concerning the short-run oil supply elasticity to improve
a pure sign restriction identication scheme. Checking sensitivity of our results to such alterations is beyond the
scope of our analysis, so we leave this for future work.
11setup using a mix of exact zero- and sign-restrictions that are implied by theoretical models.
Thus, as a rst step, we take a closer look at the theoretical DSGE literature concerned with the
modelling of the ZLB before deriving our identifying restrictions.
One approach within the theoretical literature concerned with modelling the ZLB has been to
calibrate (McCallum, 2000; Orphanides and Wieland, 2000) or estimate (Coenen and Wieland,
2003) open-economy macromodels allowing for zero interest rates. Allowing the quantity of base
money to aect output and ination even if the interest rate is zero these models imply that
liquidity injections lead to an increase in output and ination, respectively, given that these
policy measures are suciently aggressive. The particular channel that these models rely on is
the portfolio balance eect along the lines of Meltzer (1995, 2001) and Mishkin (2001) implying
a rebalancing of investors' portfolios towards, for instance, foreign assets following a base money
injection. The resulting real exchange rate depreciation in turn helps to increase output and
prices. Relative to this class of macromodels, more microfoundation is provided by a growing
DSGE literature aiming at a characterization of optimal monetary policy in a situation of zero
interest rates including Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), Jung et al. (2005), Eggertsson (2006)
and Nakov (2008). This stream of literature stresses changing expectations of future monetary
policy as the main channel of transmission of base money injections instead of a direct quantity
eect. Thus, if a base money injection is successful in that it leads to lower expected interest
rates in the future and increases inationary expectations as of today, it may increase output
and ination. While these dierent approaches focus on diverging channels underlying the eect
of quantitative easing, the outcome is similar: a rise in the reserve component of the monetary
base in a situation of zero interest rates should lead to a non-negative eect of output and prices.
Yano (2009) presents a New Keynesian DSGE model under liquidity trap conditions that is
estimated using Japanese data and thus oers more insights on the reaction of output, ination
and the interest rate following dierent business cycle shocks at the ZLB. In particular, the
model implies that prices and output move in the same direction following a demand shock and
in opposite directions after a supply shock. The interest rate stays xed at zero after both shocks.
Finally, Eggertsson (2010) provides a DSGE model in which the ZLB is the outcome of an
exogenous negative shock moving the economy away the from the zero-ination natural rate
steady state and into the ZLB. Again, in this model a positive aggregate demand shock increases
output and ination. However, in contrast to the responses implied by the model of Yano
(2009) an aggregate supply shock also leads output and ination to move in the same direction.
More specically, a positive supply shocky further enhances deation at the ZLB, which further
increases the real rate of interest and hence depresses aggregate demand.
124.4 Identifying sign-restrictions
Using the implications of these theoretical models we will now derive our identifying set of sign-
restrictions. As far as the identication of the business cycle shocks are concerned we will take
into account the diverging predictions of the DSGE models of Yano (2009) and Eggertsson (2010),
respectively, by implementing restrictions implied by the former in our benchmark identication,
while the restrictions in line with the latter model are used in an alternative identication scheme.
4.4.1 Benchmark identication
We rst describe our benchmark identication scheme for our benchmark specication. Restric-
tions are binding for twelve months following the shock14, while the zero restrictions are imposed
on impact only. A summary of the restrictions considered for the benchmark model is provided
in table 1.
Table 1: Identifying sign restrictions - benchmark identication
Response to Restriction horizon
Variable Demand shock Supply shock QE shock
CPI > 0 < 0 0,  0 k = 0;:::;11
Ind. production > 0 > 0 0 k = 0;:::;11
Reserves  0 k = 0;:::;11
Longterm yield
As table 1 shows, to identify an aggregate demand shock we restrict output and prices to move
in the same direction; both variables are assumed to increase following a positive demand dis-
turbance. For an aggregate supply shock we impose that output and prices move in the opposite
direction. It can easily be seen that these assumptions are sucient to disentangle these respec-
tive shocks. As has been explained above, these restrictions are in line with the predictions of
DSGE models explicitly modeling the zero lower bound, such as Yano (2009). Moreover, similar
restrictions are implied by standard DSGE models (Straub and Peersman, 2006; Canova and
Paustian, 2010) and are also imposed in more traditional VAR studies (Peersman, 2005; Canova
et al., 2007). The unconventional monetary shock is identied by restricting reserves not to
decrease following the shock. Furthermore, we follow the usual approach in the VAR literature
assuming a lagged impact of a monetary shoc k on output and prices; the contemporaneous
impact on these variables is restrained to zero. Similar zero restrictions have also been used by
Peersman (2010). Additionally, however, we assume a non-negative response of the price level to
the QE-shock. As outlined above, this is in line with a wide range of theoretical models assuming
14A similar restriction horizon is used by e.g. Scholl and Uhlig (2005).
13a zero lower bound (Coenen and Wieland, 2003; Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003; Eggertsson,
2006).
Because the central question assessed in this paper is concerned with the eectiveness of uncon-
ventional monetary policy measures on the real economy at the zero-lower bound, which is the
ultimate concern of central banks facing a liquidity trap situation, we leave the response of indus-
trial production to a QE-shock unrestricted. Moreover, we abstain from restricting the 10-year
government yield. As discussed in the last section, the eects of quantitative easing on longterm
yields are theoretically not clear; observing rising yields following a base money expansion may
be possible as a consequence of increasing ination expectations or increasing risk premia. In
this sense our identication scheme can be considered \agnostic" in that we let the data speak
concerning the eects of an unconventional monetary shock on the real economy and longterm
interest rates. Crucially, the contemporaneous zero restrictions following a QE-shock imposed
on the real variables ar e sucient to disentangle the unconventional monetary shock from the
business cycle disturbances (Peersman, 2010).
The set of identifying restrictions for our alternative specications given in equations (4) and (5)
can be found in table 2. The restrictions imposed on the CPI, industrial production and reserves
are the same as those used for the benchmark specication above. In contrast to Kamada and
Sugo (2006) we abstain from restricting the exchange rate. Leaving the response of the exchange
rate unrestricted allows us to let the data speak concerning the eect of the QE-shock on this
variable and thus its role in the transmission of unconventional policy.
Table 2: Identifying sign restrictions - benchmark identication (extended specications)
Response to Restriction horizon
Variable Demand shock Supply shock QE shock
CPI > 0 < 0 0,  0 k = 0;:::;11
Ind. production > 0 > 0 0 k = 0;:::;11
Reserves  0 k = 0;:::;11
Longterm yield
Exchange rate
Call Rate 0 0 0
As far as the shortterm interest rate is concerned, because we identify an expansionary shock,
the call rate should not increase following the QE-shock. Moreover, since we estimate the model
for a zero-lower bound situation, the nominal interest rate cannot fall further. We implement
this simply by assuming a zero reaction to the QE-shock on impact and let the data speak
concerning the response in the remaining periods. If we correctly specied the model for the zero
14lower bound, we should not observe any signicant reaction of the call rate following the shock.15
Moreover, we assume the call rate not to react on impact following a demand and a supply shock,
respectively, and leave the sign of the response open thereafter. Again, these restrictions are in
line with recent DSGE models of Yano (2009) and Christiano et al. (2009).
4.4.2 Alternative identication scheme
In order to check whether our results concerning the QE-shock are still valid when we account for
the somewhat diverging eects of a positive supply shock at the ZLB predicted by Eggertsson
(2010) we try to implement these restrictions in an alternative setup, summarised in table 3.
Since both the demand and supply shocks should now induce output and prices to move in
the same direction, we cannot easily disentangle the two shocks. To deal with this problem we
propose another way to disentangle shocks using the dierent slope properties of the aggregate
supply and demand equations in the model. In particular, in the model of Eggertsson (2010) the
AD-curve will always be steeper than the AS-curve and thus a positive demand shock will lead
to a proportionately larger impact on the value of output versus ination than a positive supply
shock. Thus we restrict the response of this ratio to be larger than one in absolute value for the
demand shock, and less than one for the supply shock. At the same time, a positive demand
shock is assumed to lead to a positive reaction of both output and prices, while a positive supply
shock is restricted to lower these variables. The QE-shock is identied as before and can again
be disentangled from the other shocks by imposing the exact zero-restrictions.
Table 3: Identifying sign restrictions - alternative identication
Response to Restriction horizon
Variable Demand shock Supply shock QE shock
CPI > 0 < 0 0,  0 k = 0;:::;11
Ind. production > 0 < 0 0 k = 0;:::;11
Reserves  0 k = 0;:::;11
j
^ y
j > 1 < 1 k = 0;:::;11
15Alternatively, we could implement this by means of a \near-zero" restriction specifying the response of the
call rate to stay \reasonably close" to zero following the unconventional monetary shock:    rR;QE;t  ,
where rR;QE;t denotes the impulse response of the call rate following a quantitative easing shock at horizon
t = 1;:::K and  denotes a threshold set close to zero. Our main results are robust to using this identication
scheme. However, since it is much more restrictive we prefer to use zero restrictions on impact only.
155 Results
5.1 Impulse response analysis - benchmark regression
Figures 5, 6 and 7 show the impulse responses to the three shocks based on the benchmark
identication and specication schemes explained above. Figure 5 shows the responses to our
unconventional monetary policy shock. In the gure, the inner lines denote the median impulse
responses from a Bayesian vector autoregression with 1000 draws, while the outer lines indicate
one-standard error condence bands. The response of reserves has been restricted not to decrease
following the shock, so the immediate positive response is not surprising by construction. In
particular, reserves rise by up to 10% and stay signicantly above the zero line for quite a
bit longer than preset. As restricted, CPI does not react on impact and responds positively
thereafter. It can be seen that the response of the price level is rather weak staying below 0.1%.
Moreover, the response becomes insignicant soon aft er the end of the restriction horizon. Hence,
all in all, the response of the price level to the QE shock is temporary and rather weak implying
that the rate of ination also reacts only temporarily and weakly.
Crucially, the main variable of interest, industrial production, has been left unrestricted except
for the contemporaneous zero restriction. It can be seen in the gure that an expansionary
QE-shock leads to a signicant increase of industrial production by about 0.5% after about 18
months. This response is temporary and fades after about three years. Thus, our VAR-based
evidence indicates that unconventional monetary policy by increasing reserves can in fact increase
economic activity temporarily. Finally, in contrast to some previous studies we did not restrict
the response of the longterm government bond yield since its reaction following a QE-shock shock
is theoretically unclear. In fact gure 5 shows an initial negative but insignicant reaction of this
variable. Hence, our result does not support the view that QE works by lowering longterm rates.
This nding conrms the validity of our agnostic approach with respect to the longterm yield;
ide ntication of an unconventional shock by an explicit negative restriction on this variable may
lead to misleading results.
All in all, the results presented in gure 5 suggest that the quantitative easing strategy adopted by
the Bank of Japan in the early 2000's in a situation of near-zero interest rates has been successful
in stimulating real economic activity, at least in the short run. However, our results also show
that the Bank of Japan's second main goal motivating this policy, namely to permanently raise
ination and to eventually bring an end to Japan's deationary episode, does not seem to have
been achieved by the QE-shock. In fact, core CPI only rises to the extent that we restrict it
and is just on the verge of insignicance thereafter. More importantly, whilst it may still be
argued that core CPI rises somewhat after a QE-shock, the same cannot be said for its rate of
change, the core ination rate. Hence, our benchmark results provide mixed evidence for the
eectiveness of the Bank of Japan's QE-policy.
16Figure 5: Impulse responses to a QE-shock - benchmark identication and model
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The gure displays responses to a QE-shock as identied above. The inner lines denote the median impulse
responses from a Bayesian vector autoregression with 1000 draws, while the outer lines indicate one-standard
error condence bands. The vertical dotted lines indicate the restriction horizon.
Figure 6: Impulse responses to a demand shock - benchmark identication and model
 






























        CPI          















     Reserves        
















    Longterm Yield   
The gure displays responses to a demand shock as identied above. The inner lines denote the median impulse
responses from a Bayesian vector autoregression with 1000 draws, while the outer lines indicate one-standard
error condence bands. The vertical dotted lines indicate the restriction horizon.
17Figure 7: Impulse responses to a supply shock - benchmark identication and model
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The gure displays responses to a supply shock as identied above. The inner lines denote the median impulse
responses from a Bayesian vector autoregression with 1000 draws, while the outer lines indicate one-standard
error condence bands. The vertical dotted lines indicate the restriction horizon.
The impulse response functions for the demand and supply shocks are shown in gures 6 and
7 respectively. These two shocks are mainly identied for the purpose of controlling for other
business cycle disturbances with which the QE-shock might be confused. Because most variables
have been restricted we only briey discuss the results here. Following a demand shock, industrial
production and the CPI are restricted to rise. Hence the initial increase in these variables is not
surprising. However, note that CPI rises signicantly over the entire response horizon we study.
And also industrial production does stay signicantly positive for somewhat longer than the
restriction horizon. Turning to the responses of reserves and longterm yields to the demand
shock, we nd reserves falling signicantly and in a hump-shaped pattern by around 5% and
the longterm yield rising signicantly on impact by 0.05%. These results can be explained
by reserves being run down by banks needing to increase lending in response to the positive
demand shock and by inationary pressures bidding up longterm yields. Figure 7 nally shows
the impulse response functions following a supply shock. Again, the initial increase in industrial
production and decrease in CPI are by construction. It is interesting to see that the impulse
responses become insignicant soon after the restriction horizon. At the same time the responses
of reserves and yields are quite similar to those to the demand shock.
185.2 Alternative specications
We now focus on the responses to the QE-shock only and discuss the results of the other two spec-
ications. Figure 8 shows the impulse responses to the QE-shock resulting from the specication
including the exchange rate. This serves both as a robustness test and because we want to study
whether the exchange rate follows an interesting pattern that might help explaining the trans-
mission mechanism of the QE-shock. As can be seen in the gure, the qualitative results do not
change after controlling for business cycle disturbances. Industrial production still rises by up to
0.5%; however, error bands are somewhat wider. As in the benchmark case, the response of the
consumer price index becomes signicant after a while, however, the delay is somewhat longer.
The responses of the other variables are very similar to those in the benchmark case. Thus, our
extended identication scheme does not change our main conclusion that while production and
prices could be increased temporarily by quantitative easing measures, the longterm ination en-
vironment has not be en aected by this policy. Moreover, the response of the longterm yield is
robust to this extended specication conrming that longterm rates do in fact not fall after such
an unconventional shock. However, adding the exchange rate does not help us in shedding more
light on the specics of the transmission mechanism. In fact, the real eective exchange rate is
insignicant over the entire horizon. Its dynamics does however point to a gradual depreciation.16
16The exchange rate rst seems to appreciate (an appreciation is a fall in the impulse response), but then to
gradually depreciate.
19Figure 8: Impulse responses to a QE-shock - including the exchange rate
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The gure displays responses to a QE-shock as identied above. The inner lines denote the median impulse
responses from a Bayesian vector autoregression with 1000 draws, while the outer lines indicate one-standard
error condence bands. The vertical dotted lines indicate the restriction horizon.
20Turning to the specication including the call rate of interest, gure 9 shows the impulse responses
to the QE-shock. Our key results are unchanged in this specication; again, the condence
intervals are somewhat wider. Interestingly the call rate, which is restricted not to change on
impact, does not react signicantly to the QE-shock. In other words, our assumption that the
Bank of Japan's key monetary policy instrument after 1995 was indeed the amount of current
account balances, i.e. reserves, is supported by the data.



































































































 Exchange Rate       
The gure displays responses to a QE-shock as identied above. The inner lines denote the median impulse
responses from a Bayesian vector autoregression with 1000 draws, while the outer lines indicate one-standard
error condence bands. The vertical dotted lines indicate the restriction horizon.
215.3 Alternative identication scheme
We next turn to our benchmark specication results when we identify our three shocks according
to the alternative sign restrictions given in table 3. These restrictions dier from the benchmark
restrictions only in the identication of the demand and supply shocks. Because the theoretical
predictions from the DSGE-model are the same for a positive demand and a negative supply
shock, we need to impose the additional restriction on the relative magnitudes of the output and
price responses. Results for the three shocks are given in gures 10, 11 and 12.
Figure 10: Impulse responses to a QE-shock - alternative identication scheme
 

































        CPI          















     Reserves        
















  Longterm Yield     
The gure displays responses to a QE-shock as identied above. The inner lines denote the median impulse
responses from a Bayesian vector autoregression with 1000 draws, while the outer lines indicate one-standard
error condence bands. The vertical dotted lines indicate the restriction horizon.
Figure 10 shows the impulse responses to the QE-shock using our alternative identication
scheme. As expected the results are very similar to those from our benchmark identication.
More interestingly, turning to the impulse responses to the demand and supply shocks under
the alternative identication scheme, we do nd some dierences. Figure 11 shows the impulse
responses to the demand shock. Again, the initial increase in industrial production and CPI is
by construction. Again, the price level remains signicantly positive for much longer than the re-
stricted horizon. But overall the response is less strong compared to our benchmark identication
scheme. Similarly, longterm yields do not react signicantly at all this time.
22Figure 11: Impulse responses to a demand shock - alternative identication scheme
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The gure displays responses to a demand shock as identied above. The inner lines denote the median impulse
responses from a Bayesian vector autoregression with 1000 draws, while the outer lines indicate one-standard
error condence bands. The vertical dotted lines indicate the restriction horizon.
Finally, gure 12 shows the impulse responses to the supply shock under this identication:
industrial production and CPI are restricted to fall following a positive supply shock. The crucial
identication restriction regarding the relative magnitudes of the responses of production and
prices can be seen by comparing the absolute size of the response of production to the demand
and supply shocks. Industrial production is restricted to respond stronger than CPI following
the demand shock, but less strong than CPI following the supply shock. This is conrmed by
gures 11 and 12. But note now the dierence in the responses to the supply shock as shown in
gure 12 from the benchmark model shown in gure 7. CPI remains signicantly negative for
the entire period, reserves signicantly rise after around 1-2 years, and the longterm yield is on
the verge of being signicantly negative after half a year.
5.4 Forecast error variance decomposition
In order to get a better understanding of the relative importance of our identied QE-shock for
the variables of interest we calculate the forecast error variance decomposition which gives the
estimated shares of the variability of each variable due to the respective shocks. Our main interest
is of course focused on the variance shares of the QE-shock because they can be interpreted as
measures of the quantitative eect of unconventional policy shocks on the real economy. Table
4 displays the median of the forecast error variance shares of the endogenous variables for each
of the three identied shocks at the one to ve-year forecast horizon. The last column of the
23Figure 12: Impulse responses to a supply shock - alternative identication scheme
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The gure displays responses to a supply shock as identied above. The inner lines denote the median impulse
responses from a Bayesian vector autoregression with 1000 draws, while the outer lines indicate one-standard
error condence bands. The vertical dotted lines indicate the restriction horizon.
left panel shows the sum of the variance shares of the respective variables due to all identied
shocks. It can be seen that together the structural shocks explain between 55% and 84% of the
variations in the endogenous variables, which is a relatively large share. Moreover, it can be
seen that the QE-shock explains some of the variations in the CPI and industrial production,
our main variables of interest; however, these shares are rather small.While the unconventional
shock explains uctuations in output by up to 13%, the share is only 3 - 8% for the CPI. For
both variables, the demand shock is the dominant source of variation with variance shares of
around 40 - 50%. The right panel of Table 4 shows some interesting ndings for the alternative
specication including the exchange rate as well as the call rate. While the QE-shock still has a
relatively minor role in explaining variations in output and prices, it seems to be relatively more
important for the uctuations in the exchange rate explaining around 15%. This suggests that
while the response of this variable to the unconventional shock is found to be insignicant, this
shock still has some explanatory power with regard to exchange rate uctuations pointing to a
non-negligible role of the exchange rate in the transmission of such shocks at the ZLB. Finally,
as one would expect for a liquidity trap situation, our structural shocks only explain a relatively
small share of variations in the call rate; the sum of the variance shares only range from 12%
to 35%. As expected, the demand shock is the dominant source of variations in the shortterm
interest rate.
24Table 4: Forecast error variance decomposition
Benchmark specication - shock to: Alternative specication - shock to:
Variable Horizon QE Supply Demand Total QE Supply Demand Total
Ind. production 1st 1 2 54 57 2 21 27 50
2nd 6 6 51 63 6 15 27 48
3rd 12 7 45 64 10 14 23 47
4th 13 8 43 64 11 14 22 47
5th 13 8 43 64 11 14 22 47
CPI 1st 3 17 38 58 4 21 25 50
2nd 5 8 49 62 5 10 29 44
3rd 6 5 49 60 6 6 27 39
4th 7 5 46 58 7 5 25 37
5th 8 5 42 55 7 5 23 35
Reserves 1st 70 9 5 84 45 7 5 57
2nd 50 13 14 77 27 8 10 45
3rd 38 16 21 75 21 7 15 43
4th 34 17 24 75 18 7 16 41
5th 30 17 25 72 17 7 17 41
LT yield 1st 12 49 13 74 13 7 12 32
2nd 14 37 17 68 13 7 14 34
3rd 17 32 17 66 14 7 14 35
4th 18 31 18 67 15 7 15 37
5th 18 30 19 67 15 7 15 37
Exchange rate 1st 16 10 8 34
2nd 15 13 9 37
3rd 15 14 11 40
4th 15 13 14 42
5th 14 12 17 43
Call rate 1st 3 3 6 12
2nd 7 7 12 26
3rd 10 8 13 31
4th 12 9 13 34
5th 12 9 14 35
5.5 Robustness
The rst robustness check is concerned with the median as a way to summarise the information
obtained from the Bayesian approach to calculating impulse responses. Figures 13 to 15 replicate
the median impulse responses along with the 68% condence intervals to the respective shocks.
The red dashed lines additionally show the impulse responses generated by the one model that
is closest to the median over all 500 models. It can be seen that generally, the impulse responses
generated by this "close-to-median" model are quite similar to the median over all models.
25Figure 13: Impulse responses to a QE-shock - close to median model
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Responses to a QE-shock. The inner lines denote the median impulse responses from a Bayesian vector
autoregression with 1000 draws, while the outer lines indicate one-standard error condence bands. The red
dotted lines display the response generated by the close to median model.
Figure 14: Impulse responses to a demand shock - close to median model
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Responses to a demand shock. The inner lines denote the median impulse responses from a Bayesian vector
autoregression with 1000 draws, while the outer lines indicate one-standard error condence bands. The red
dotted lines display the response generated by the close to median model.
26Figure 15: Impulse responses to a supply shock - close to median model
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Responses to a demand shock. The inner lines denote the median impulse responses from a Bayesian vector
autoregression with 1000 draws, while the outer lines indicate one-standard error condence bands. The red
dotted lines display the response generated by the close to median model.
The second robustness check involves specifying the restriction horizon k. As noted by, for
instance, Uhlig (2005), it is dicult to base the choice of the appropriate restriction horizon
on economic theory resulting in some degree of arbitrariness in specifying this parameter. We
therefore check sensitivity of our results to this choice by estimating the benchmark model (for the
1-shock case) for dierent restriction horizons. Figure 16 shows the impulse response functions for
our variables of interest, CPI and industrial production, for a lower restriction horizon compared
to the benchmark model k = 6 and for a longer horizon k = 18 (displayed in the rst and the
third row, respectively). The benchmark case, k = 12 is given in the second row. It can be
seen in the gure that our main results are qualitatively insensitive to variations in k; industrial
production shows a signicant and positive response at least over several months. However, the
magnitude of this increase diers among the respective cases. While for k = 6 the positive impact
on economic activity is signicant only with a delay of about two years and vanishes rather fast
following the shock17, the response is stronger and lasts somewhat longer for k = 18.18
17Similar results are obtained for a restriction horizon of nine months or eight months.
18Again, results are very similar for even longer restriction horizons of, say, 24 months.
27Figure 16: Impulse responses to a QE-shock - varying the restriction horizon
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The gure displays responses of industrial production and the CPI to a QE-shock shock as identied above. The
inner lines denote the median impulse responses from a Bayesian vector autoregression with 500 draws, while
the outer lines indicate one-standard error condence bands. The vertical dotted lines indicate the restriction
horizon.
286 Discussion and Conclusion
The primary objective of this paper has been to agnostically assess the real eects of QE measures
adopted by the Bank of Japan for a liquidity trap episode. We suggest to use results from the
theoretical literature to derive our identifying restrictions for our SVAR. In particular, we propose
a set of sign restrictions based on predictions of DSGE models explicitly taking into account the
ZLB that clearly identify an unconventional shock without imposing restrictions on interest
rates or spreads. Given that a broad consensus is still missing as to how to identify monetary
shocks at the ZLB, we used two dierent identication strategies and various specications. Our
results show that a QE-shock does positively and signicantly aect industrial production. After
around two years industrial production has risen by about 0.5% following an increase in reserves
by 10%. On the other hand, this shock has virtually no eect on core CPI and thus the rate
of ination. Concerning longterm government yields we do not nd any signicant reduction in
yields following the QE-shock. Moreover, while the exchange rate seems to depreciate after an
expanisonary shock, the eect is not signicant.
Overall, our empirical results show that unconventional monetary policy can positively aect
real economic activity even when the economy is in the liquidity trap. However, the QE-shocks
we identify do not signicantly aect ination. Our results concerning the longterm yield and
the exchange rate therefore suggest that a direct quantity eect such as a portfolio rebalancing
channel in the spirit of Meltzer (1995) has not been at work following the QE policies in Japan.
We believe these results are interesting not only for the Japanese economy, but also for other
advanced economies where monetary policy is constrained by the ZLB.
29A Data
In the benchmark case we include four variables reecting the macroeconomic and monetary
environment of the Japanese economy. We use monthly observations for the period of January
1995 to September 2010. The start of the sample period is motivated by the fact that the Bank
of Japan rst decreased nominal interest rates to below 1% during the course of 1995 and we are
mainly interested in the eectiveness of monetary policy at near-zero interest rates.
Monetary variables
As far as the monetary variables are concerned, we include the shortterm interest rate as well
as a measure of reserves; both series have been obtained from the Bank of Japan's statistics
website. As the shortterm interest rate we include the monthly average of the uncollateralized
overnight call rate, which has been the target rate for the Japanese Central Bank from July 1985
(Miyao, 2002). As far as reserves are concerned, to be able to identify the QE-shock we include
the average outstanding current account balances held by nancial institutions at the Bank of
Japan. This is the part of the monetary base that can be referred to as reserves held at the
central bank. Under the QE policy this variable has gained importance as the main operating
target for the Bank of Japan.
Prices
We include the core consumer price index, which measures the development of consumer prices
excluding energy and food. Base year is 2005. The core CPI has been obtained from Datastream.
Moreover, we include a narrow index of the real eective exchange rate of the Yen against other
currencies as published on the Bank for International Settlements' (BIS) website. Both series
are seasonally adjusted by X12-ARIMA.
Industrial Production
We include a measure of the Japanese industrial production as a generally used indicator of
economic activity. Base year is 2005. The series has been obtained from Datastream and is
seasonally adjusted by X12-ARIMA.
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